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1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this research is to continue the development of a comprehensive
approach to software safety and to evaluate the approach with a case study. The case
study is a major part of the project, and it involves the analysis of a specific safety-
critical system from the medical equipment domain. The particular application being
used was selected because of the availability of a suitable candidate system. We
consider the results to be generally applicable and in no way particularly limited by the
domain.
With more and more important functions in existing and proposed safety-critical
systems being implemented by computers, concern over the role of software in such
systems has increased. An especially important area is that class of systems for which
safety rather than reliability or availability is the overriding issue. Some research that
addresses the safety of software specifically has been reported but many open questions
remain. In particular, no complete process is available for engineers to follow when
building applications software for systems in which safety considerations dominate. We
are developing such a process through a combination of theoretical and empirical
research.
The research is concentrating on issues raised by the specification and verification
phases of the software lifecycle since they are central to our previously-developed
rigorous definitions of software safety. The theoretical research is based on our
framework of definitions for software safety. In the area of specification, the main topics
being investigated are (a) the development of techniques for building system fault trees
that correctly incorporate software issues and fla) the development of rigorous
techniques for the preparation of software safety specifications. The results of research
to date is documented in a latter section of this report.
-1-
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A second area of theoretical investigation is the development of verification
methods tailored to the characteristics of safety requirements. Verification of the correct
implementation of the safety specification is central to the goal of establishing safe
software. Our experience to date has shown that, for certain classes of safety problems,
exhaustive testing of a system is possible in reasonable amounts of time. Similarly, we
have shown that a complete test set for certain properties can be derived automatically
from the safety specifications if these specifications are written in a suitably formal
notation such as 'Z' [11].
The empirical component of this research is focusing on a case study in order to
provide detailed characterizations of the issues as they appear in practice, and to
provide a testbed for the evaluation of various existing and new theoretical results, tools
and techniques. The system being used in the case study is the Magnetic Stereotaxis
System (MSS), a safety-critical medical system presently under development. The
overall, long term approach being taken in the empirical research using this system is to
develop fully functional software of sufficient quality to be suitable for safety-critical
use. This approach is necessary to ensure that the research undertaken is not weakened
by unrealistic assumptions or restrictions. The empirical research is implementing the
various techniques resulting from the theoretical research and using these
implementations to assess the the theoretical results.
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. In the next section, the
Magnetic Stereotaxis System is summarized. Previous related work is summarized in
section 3. The research results to date are reviewed in section 4. Presentations given on
the general topic covered by this grant and listed in section 5, and publications resulting
from this grant are summarized in section 6.
-2-
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2. THE MAGNETIC STEREOTAXIS SYSTEM
The Magnetic Stereotaxis System (MSS) is an investigational device for performing
human neurosurgery being developed in a joint effort between the Department of
Physics at the University of Virginia and the Department of Neurosurgery at the
University of Washington [15]. It operates by manipulating a small permanent magnet
(known as a "seed") within the brain using an externally applied magnetic field. By
varying the magnitude and gradient of the external field, the seed can be moved along a
non-linear path and positioned at a site requiring therapy, e.g., a tumor. The device can
be used for hyperthermia by radio-frequency heating of the seed from an external source
or for chemotherapy by using the seed to deliver drugs to a site within the brain. The
MSS concept promises to be far less traumatic to the patient than present invasive
approaches to such treatments. However, the concept is new and its success depends on
satisfactory completion of several magnetic systems engineering tasks (now well
underway).
The externally applied magnetic field of the MSS has to have a gradient of at least
five Tesla/meter in order to move the seed through brain tissue. This field is produced
by a set of six superconducting coils that are mounted in a cryostatic enclosure that
surrounds the patient's head during surgery. Even using superconducting coils,
achieving the field required within the small available space is one of many research
issues that have to be resolved.
The seed location within the brain is monitored in real time by an X-ray imaging
system that provides two perpendicular images that include views of the skull, a set of
fiducial markers, and the seed. Data from these images is combined with a set of stored,
pre-operative Magnetic Resonance Images (MRI's) and displayed for the neurosurgeon.
The seed is maneuvered to the region of interest within the brain by varying the
-3-
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externally applied magnetic field.
The MSS includes a computer system that is used:
• to control the X-ray, R.F-heating, and electromagnetic subsystems,
• to present MR images and X-ray data to the neurosurgeon, and
• to accept the neurosurgeon's input and translate it into commands to the various
subsystems.
Clearly, the MSS is a safety-critical system. The greatest concern is, of course, with
patient injury. A patient could be injured by failure of any of the physical subsystems.
For example, failure of the seed-positioning coils could move the seed incorrectly and
result in serious brain damage. Similarly, failure of the X-ray or RF-heating subsystems
could injure the patient by excessive radiation exposure or tissue heating.
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Just as subsystem failure could lead to injury, so could failure of the control
software. For example, a software failure could cause incorrect drive currents to be
applied to the seed-positioning coils thereby resulting in brain damage. Even a failure
of the image display system could lead to injury if the surgeon's actions were based on
improperly displayed MR images or X-ray data.
Although patient injury is the greatest concern, protection of the equipment itself
from damage resulting from incorrect use or internal failure is also important. For
example, the seed-positioning coils are very high energy devices and the current
through them has to be managed very carefully. Inappropriate current changes could
quench the coils and cause damage to the ancillary cryogenic equipment.
w
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The state of the MSS is that the concept is fully defined, the majority of the basic
research in physics is complete, and a fully functional prototype is nearing completion
for demonstration and evaluation. It will be operated by prototype software [15]. We
using the MSS as a case study in our research on safety-critical systems. Our goal is the
development of tools and techniques that permit such systems to be built with the
required assurance of safe operation. Figure 1 show the major components of the MSS.
3. PREVIOUS WORK
We have previously defined a preliminary framework of definitions for software
safety. This framework was deemed to be a necessary first step in the development of
the comprehensive software safety process that we seek. In addition, we have
previously identified certain elements of the software-safety process that we are
developing. This previous work is summarized here briefly as background for the
section on research results.
-5-
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3.1 Definitional Framework
The definitional framework views a system as a set of interacting components [4].
As has been noted elsewhere [4, 5], software is never unsafe in isolation. But, in practice,
software is never used in isolation. Software is always used within a system, and it is
merely one of many components of a complete system. It is a component of a complete
system in the same sense that entities such as computer hardware, sensors, actuators,
power supplies, packaging, and even human operators are each merely components of a
system.
In a general sense, none of these various components is unsafe in isolation because,
when isolated, these entities are separated from the notion of hazard. It is only in the
context of the complete system that the various hazards have meaning. None of the
components changes and suddenly becomes "unsafe" when incorporated into a system.
Any design deficiency in a component is present when the component is isolated just as
when it is part of a system. A deficiency in a component leads to a hazard only when
the component is part of a system because it is the system that defines the hazard.
Hazard is a system concept, not a component concept. In particular, as noted by
Leveson the notion of hazard is not a software concept [5].
Since software is a system component, an important goal in the development of a
theory of software safety is separation of the theory from systems safety yet smooth
integration with it. Without separation, we run the risk of needlessly complicating and
weakening our conclusions about software with external systems concerns. Without
integration, we run the risk of reaching conclusions about software that do not
contribute to the safety of the associated systems.
m
W
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The basic structure of the definitional framework requires three sets of
specifications for each system component. The first defines the overall functionality of
the component, the second states the assumptions that can be made about the
component's behavior should it fail, and the third specifies the action that the
component is to take when other components fail. Any component in a safety-critical
system is expected to comply with all three of these sets of specifications. From the
perspective of component failure, software is no different from any other component.
Within this framework, the systems engineer has the formal role of preparing a set
of specifications for the software, and the resulting software is defined to be safe if it
complies with these specifications. Once it is developed, showing that software is safe
according to this definition is, therefore, an exercise in verification. The software is safe,
in this formal sense, to the extent that this verification is successful.
In a strictly formal sense, the software engineer's role is to implement the software
and show that the safety specifications developed by the systems engineer are
implemented correctly. The formal role of the software engineer is limited in this way
because this is all the software engineer is qualified to do. Informally, however, the software
engineer is encouraged to contribute to the development of the specifications, to analyze
the specifications, to report anything that appears to be a deficiency in the specifications,
and generally be on the lookout for any defect in the system that could detract from safe
operation. These are not formal roles of the software engineer, however, because he or
she is unlikely to be qualified to accept them.
-7-
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3.2 Software-Safety Process
Our research on the software-safety process is in two complementary areas. The
first is concerned with developing a rigorous approach to determining and specifying
the software safety requirements. The second is focusing on means of assessing the
software safety using both formal verification techniques and empirical testing methods.
The various theoretical approaches that are being developed are inspired by the case
study. Similarly, the effectiveness of these approaches are being assessed using the case
study.
Previous approaches to software safety have failed to stress the importance of a
separate specification of the software safety requirements. Instead, the implementation
of the software has sometimes been made to double as the safety specification.
Although this approach eliminates the need for a separate safety specification, it makes
the process of verification unnecessarily difficult. Ultimately, it is only the verification of
software safety that is important. It is the specification that makes such a verification
possible
A separate safety specification provides a basis for precise communication between
the software engineer and the systems engineer. It also permits the exploitation of the
precise definition of software safety given in the definitional framework we are
developing. Recall that, within this framework, the systems engineer has the formal role
of preparing a set of specifications for the software. The resulting software is defined to
be safe if it complies with these specifications, and, therefore, formally showing that
software is safe is an instance of verification. The software is safe, in this formal sense, to
the extent that this verification is successful. It should be noted that verification here
might involve many technologies including testing and inspection. It is because of this
definition that the our research focuses on the specification of safety and the subsequent
-8-
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verification of the correct implementation of those specifications.
At present, system fault tree development for systems involving software is an ad
hoc process of refinement in which few, if any, provisions are made in the process for
the software. The process under development aims to develop system fault trees that
incorporate software systematically as system components.
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It is clear that the essence of the software safety specification is contained in the
system fault tree. Despite this, there is no rigorous method for deriving the software
safety specification from the fault tree nor verifying that a software safety specification
accurately models the intentions of the associated nodes and structure of the system
fault tree. We are investigating the possibility of deriving the system safety specification
from the system fault tree and using the derivation to show that the software safety
specification is complete and unambiguous.
Another key aspect of the process is verification. We have demonstrated the
concept of deriving a set of test cases from the formal safety specifications. In principle,
if such a test set could be derived and shown to be complete for any given system, the
correct execution of the test set would constitute a proof that the safety specification was
being met by the software implementation.
Although it has been argued that the correctness of software cannot be established
for safety-critical systems by testing [1], this is a general result to which there are
exceptions. We are of the opinion that safety is just such an exception for two reasons.
First, safety specifications are typically smaller than functional specifications, and
second, time can be accelerated during testing of safety facilities because they are called
upon to act so infrequently during normal operation. Thus testing is being developed as
an important aspect of the safety process under development.
-9-
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4. RESEARCH RESULTS TO DATE
The research results achieved during the grant reporting period are summarized in
this section. Documents mentioned are listed in detail in section 6.
4.1 Reliability Assessment
Previous work on software reliability assessment by life testing in which error
detection is imperfect has been been revised. The results are documented in a paper that
will appear in the IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering.
4.2 Definitional Framework
The definitional framework of software safety that is the basis of the software-
safety process under development has been extended and refined. The revised
framework is documented in a technical report.
4.3 Phased Inspections
An extensive experimental evaluation _of phased software inspections and the
associated toolset has been completed and documented. The research will be published
in a special issue of the Communications of the ACM on software quality that will appear
later this year.
4.4 Experience With Formal Specification
Our preliminary experience using the formal specification notation Z for the
specification of the software for the MSS has been documented. The paper was
presented at the 7th Annual Z User Group Meeting and appears in the proceedings.
- 10 -
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4.5 Reuse Of Specifications
As part of our research on formal specifications, we have developed a prototype
library of reusable specification parts. This library and some observations about the
issues in the reuse of specifications were reported in a paper at the Fifth Annual
Workshop on Institutionalizing Software Reuse and appears in the proceedings.
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4.6 Developing Test Cases From Specifications
Extended results in the development of test cases directly from formal
specifications in Z have been obtained as part of a file-system case study. These results
are documented in a technical report published by George Mason University.
4.7 Prototype Software For The Magnetic Stereotaxis System
In order to have a better vehicle for experimentation, a completely new prototype
software system is being developed for the Magnetic Stereotaxis System. The new
prototype is a distributed implementation operating on as many computers as are
required for the computational load. The new software architecture permits new
functionality to be added easily as required. In addition, the new prototype is
implemented in C++ and used the standard X-windows graphic interface and Motif
widget set.
4.8 Software Safety Process
A major goal of this research program is to develop a process by which software
specifications can be developed in a rigorous and complete manner. The present state of
the development of this process is that the overall structure has been drafted but most of
the effort during the grant reporting period has been in developing support techniques
- 11 -
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for the process.
Three key support techniques are being developed. They are Information Flow
Analysis, Software Failure Emulation, and Tri-State Models. Each of these techniques is
summarized here.
Information Flow Analysis
A difficult problem in software specification for safety-critical systems is
determining all of the different system failures for which the software might have to
take action. For example, complex peripheral equipment such as sensors and actuators
can fail in a variety of different ways and the software's response has to be carefully
specified in every possible case.
In some situations, the software specification is determined easily. For example,
the complete failure of a sensor would require the software to respond by employing a
backup sensor or different control algorithm. However, in practice there is no
systematic way to determine whether all possible failure scenarios to which the software
must respond have been identified. As an example of the difficulty, consider the X-ray
imaging system from the MSS. The following failures to which the software must
respond have been identified:
m
E
L
An X-ray source could fail on.
An X-ray source could fail off.
A fluoroscope on which an image is captured could fail and return no image.
A fluoroscope could fail and return an outdated image.
- 12-
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A fluoroscope could fail and return a defective image containing phantom objects
that are actually failed pixels in the fluoroscope.
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The communication system between the control computer and the X-ray system
could fail and supply incorrect commands or defective images.
All of the above are failure modes with which the applications engineer should be
aware. However, many different technical areas are involved and no systematic
technique exists presently to derive complete and consistent software specifications from
such complex physical systems. We have developed a solution to this problem called
Information Flow Analysis.
One of the key concepts in system safety analysis is flow analysis. Hazards are
determined by considering potential undesired energy flows. Component networks are
used to model other systems flows such as coolants, hydraulic fluids, and electrical
power. However, information flow is an altogether different notion that has yet to be
fully explored. While the disruption of information flow has been considered, the
corruption of information flow has been largely ignored. And while the disruption of
information flow is important in that it permits the software to continue monitoring and
controlling the physical devices, it is largely a systems engineering concern. Redundant
cables and the elimination of single points of failure generally suffice to ensure that
information flow will continue uninterrupted.
But such analyses have minor, if any, impact on the software safety specification. It
is much more important from the perspective of software specifications, to ensure that
all possible points of information corruption have been properly identified. If a device
failure can corrupt critical system data, the possibility exists that this faulty data could
propagate throughout the system and eventually be consumed by the software.
- 13 -
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Information Flow Analysis is a technique in which all sources of information are
determined for a system, and, for each source, the entire path from the information
source to the computer is identified. The path is then examined and, for each
component that modifies or transmits the information, all possible failure modes are
identified. The effect of each failure mode on the information is determined and, to the
extent possible, software specifications are prepared to detect the occurrence of the
failure and to counter its effects.
Using the MSS example once again, two important pieces of information for the
system are the X-ray images. The sources of this information are the X-ray emitters
themselves. The information starts out as X-ray photons that pass through the patient's
head and then through a lengthy set of processing hardware units before the images are
finally present in the memory of the control computer. The flow analysis of this
particular information identifies all possible failure modes of all possible devices that
might affect the X-ray images and determines an appropriate set of software
specifications in each case. Dealing with phantom objects on the images, for example, is
essential since a phantom could appear to be a seed or marker and lead to incorrect
image location. The software specification in this case to perform extensive
reasonableness checks on the returned image.
In general, there are two general classifications of information corruption: those
that can be detected and those that cannot. Information Flow Analysis determines all
the possible sources of information corruption and partitions them according to their
detectability. For those failures that can be detected, additional software (and perhaps
hardware) requirements will be generated. Those failures that cannot be detected will
either involve a failed device or faulty software. Those that involve failed devices will
require either higher reliability or redundancy in these devices. Those that involve
-14-
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failed software will require that techniques be applied to reduce the probability of
software failure in that case to an aCceptable level.
lIE
r.
Software Failure Emulation
The primary thrust of Information Flow Analysis is to determine the various
component defects outside of the software for which the software might have to take
action. Software Failure Emulation is a complementary technique that defines the
elements of the software that are critical to safe operation. The combined output of
Information Flow Analysis and Software Failure Emulation is the complete software
safety specification.
Software Failure Emulation is a two-phase technique that determines in a rigorous
fashion the elements of the safety requirements that are dictated by software. The
technique takes advantage of the fact that systems engineers impose a certain level of
formality on software safety when they perform systems safety analyses such as fault-
tree analysis. A system fault-tree analysis* is intended to uncover all of the
combinations of system occurrences that could lead to a system hazard. The technique
originated from the need to identify the likely hardware degradation faults and
combinations thereof that could lead to a hazard. As such, a system fault tree
documents in a systematic way the various events of which the systems engineer needs
to be aware. Unfortunately, typical system fault tree theory and practice do not include
software.
The key concerns with software in a safety-critical system are:
'_ It is extremely important to distinguish between system fault trees and software fault trees. The former are tools
used by systems engineers to determine system hazards. The latter is an informal software verification technique.
-15-
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• that it will not respond correctly when required, or
• that it will initiate actions when not required to that lead to a hazard.
The latter concern arises because any software-initiated activity in some other
component of a system must be considered as a failure mode for that component. For
example, if the software could switch on an X-ray device at an inappropriate time, it is
reasonable to assume that the device might also have switched itself on. If the software
fails to turn the device off, this appears no different from the device refusing a request to
turn off. In this sense, the software makes the device appear to have failed when in fact
it has not. Analysis based on this observation derives from the fact that software can
give the appearance of, i.e., emulate, component failure, hence the name of the technique.
The first phase of Software Failure Emulation is the determination of which system
activities the software can initiate and which it can detect. The second phase of Software
Failure Emulation consists of determining all of these possible failure modes
methodically. This is done as part of an extended form of fault tree analysis.
There is one subtle but significant difference between this fault tree analysis and
conventional fault tree analysis that must be considered here. This difference is in
addition to the fact that the actual fault trees must be retained for further analysis, rather
than being discarded after the probability of failure is computed. This difference is the
fact that a software failure can actually effect many devices concurrently and that the
probability of failures must be ignored when building the fault trees. In conventional
fault tree analysis, construction of subtrees is halted when it becomes clear that the
probability of a given branch is low enough to be ignored. These extremely low
probabilities of failure are usually caused by coincident, independent failure of several
very reliable devices. Since the already low probabilities of failures are multiplied to
-16-
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determine the probability of the combined event, these values can be vanishingly small
and safely ignored. However, as has been noted above, software can emulate the failure
of the device and no probability of failure has yet been assigned to that software. In
addition, the presence of controlling software can eliminate the assumption of
independence and so system fault trees involving software-controlled devices must be
completed beyond the point where they would normally be truncated.
Tri-State Models
Tri-state modeling is a technique that is related to Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, and system Fault Tree Analysis. The technique is still
under development but appears at this stage to be a general technique that includes the
three other forms of analysis as special cases.
m
m
Tri-state Models are used to document and analyze all of the manners in which
modules and devices can affect one another, either via direct control or by passing
information that could affect the operation of the recipient. Tri-state models depend on
Module Interaction Graphs which are hierarchical structures. They begin at the highest
level with individual nodes representing the software and the various major system
components, including the user if present. Lower levels are expanded to reveal software
component objects and physical subsystems respectively. Arcs to and from components
can be directed to the entire component, or to one or more sub-components within.
These graphs are similar to state-charts, but with the entries representing objects rather
than states. A complete module interaction graph represents the complete information
flow throughout all the components (including software) of the system.
The arcs coming from a node in a module-interaction graph are the three
transitions that a system can take as a result of the effects of the component represented
-17-
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by the node. The three transitions are (a) correct operation, (b) erroneous operation that
was detected, and (c) erroneous operation that was not detected. Since they represent
state transitions over time that a system experiences, the module interaction graph is
actually a particular form of Markov model. As such, Tri-state models are based on
Markov analysis.
Module Interaction Graphs make several simplifying assumptions. The first of
these is that all undetected errors are of equal severity. This assumption ensures that we
can use a single state to represent the possibility of any combination of failures.
Although this might not appear to be true, the context in which this information is later
used will ensure that this does not introduce difficulties. The second assumption is that
if an error can be detected later in the flow, it can be detected immediately after it is
introduced. This assumption will be weakened in subsequent work. The assumption
ensures that extra states to handle all possible latent failures will not need to be
introduced.
The transitions between the first and third states are fairly straightforward, but the
transitions dealing with the detected failures are more involved. There are several ways
to deal with a detected failure. If the failure involves a detected operator error or a
failure of a device that can be reset or replaced, the option exists to repeat the failed
operation. If the failure can be recovered from via alternate functionality, this
alternative can be invoked. Another alternative is to report the failure as a failure of the
module that is under investigation. That these alternatives correspond exactly to the
exception handling concepts of restarting, recovering, and propagating is not a
coincidence. In the event that either the detection, recovery, or propagation mechanism
fails, the detectable error becomes an undetectable error.
- 18 -
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The creation of the module interaction graphs is in itself a useful endeavor. It
requires the systems engineer to consider methodically every possible alternative that
could affect the operation of a given component. Each possible exceptional condition
would have to be individually considered and dealt with. The module interaction graph
also provides a convenient mechanism for precisely documenting these considerations.
The resulting graphs also represent a formal entity (a Markov model) that can be
subjected to formal manipulation. If each transition is assigned a percentage possibility,
it is trivial to calculate the percentage chance of an error passing undetected through the
system. Furthermore, a fault tree can be derived representing a complete expression of
how a device failure could occur. These fault trees could be incorporated into the
system fault trees in order to explore common-cause failures.
We are continuing the process of defining and evaluating the techniques that are
suggested by the concept of Tr-state Models.
__=
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5. PRESENTATIONS GIVEN
During the grant reporting period, in addition to the presentations made at
conferences listed in the following section, presentations were given at the following
locations:
• Praxis PLC, Bath, England.
• University of Southampton, Southampton, England.
• Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC.
• Food and Drug Administration, Washington, DC.
E
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@ Medical College of Virginia, Richmond, VA.
West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV.
• College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA.
University of Houston, Clearlake, TX.
6. RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS
Several publications have either been prepared, published, or accepted for
publication during the grant reporting period. In this section, these publications are
listed. Copies of each publication have been supplied to the sponsor under separate
cover.
(1)
(2)
(3)
P.E. Ammann, S.S. Brilliant, and J.C. Knight, 'q"he Effect of Imperfect Error
Detection on Reliability Assessment via Life Testing", IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, to appear.
J.C. Knight and E.A. Myers, "An Improved Software Inspection Technique and an
Empirical Evaluation of Its Effectiveness", Communications of the ACM, to appear.
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